
Social Disciplining and the German Jewish Schools in Galicia, 1782–1806

Dirk Sadowski, Braunschweig

I suppose that the German Jewish schools in Galicia, which were under the supervision of Herz Homberg, are of considerable interest, even passion, to many scholars of the *Haskalah* (Jewish Enlightenment). For us they remain a fascinating vista. There we see one of the *maskilim* (Jewish enlighteners) labeled ‘radical’ for trying to implement his maxims of enlightened pedagogy in the framework of a large-scale project promoted by the state. We watch as he fails, foundering on the rocks of the gap between his aspirations and the desires of the government, foiled by the passive resistance of the Galician Jews, the historical developments at the time, and his downright difficult temperament. Here is an engaging drama whose plot reveals the Enlightenment in the full breadth of its tragic dialectic. But we are not here to enjoy the play. Rather, we want to look at events through an analytical and critical prism. In the framework of the history of the *Haskalah*, we look at how cameralist aims for education gradually overlay and distort the pedagogical canon of the *maskilim*. In regard to social history, we are interested in the structures of the absolutist compulsory school system and the impact of that system on traditional Jewish society. Also of interest is the question regarding the genesis of new elites within or on the periphery of this society. Finally, using the microscope of historical anthropology and the cultural sciences, we will look at the complex web of interactions among teachers, children, parents, Jewish *kahal* (community) leaders, and local district and provincial officials — in short, a range of stakeholders in a concrete situation. The interlocking of the two angles of vision here, the *macro-perspective*, grounded in structural history, and the *micro-perspective*, anchored in cultural anthropology, is decisive for a proper analysis of the complex historical events we are discussing here. In the narrative we construct, the voices of the little people in their everyday lives will become audible, just as will the voices of the agents of state centralization, productivization, and disciplining.

On the *macro*: In my study, I use the concept of “social disciplining” in the more narrow sense as first formulated by the German constitutional historian Gerhard Oestreich in 1968, a moral and behavioral disciplining of the modern person, from ‘above,’ intended, orchestrated, and executed by the absolutist or reform-absolutist state,¹ and in the broader sense as delineated by Michel Foucault, more oriented to discursive practices and changing constellations of power.² If we seek to apply these concepts of “disciplining” in the context of the reform-absolutist school system, what we first notice is what was happening *inside* the school walls so to speak. We look at the disciplining of the children by the curriculum and the rituals accompanying its teaching. We may ask: how effective was this education, to what extent were the cameralist-utilitarian values internalized?, as spelled out, for example, in James van Horn Melton’s work on the origins of compulsory schooling in reform-absolutist Prussia and Austria.³ The focus here is less on education in the sense of *Bildung* (education) in the service of learning and mastering the three ‘Rs’ – reading, writing, and ‘rithmetic – and more on what in German is termed *Erziehung*, in the sense of ‘training,’ inculcating subjects with the values of the fear of God, industriousness, hard work, obedience, discipline, and social modesty in terms of wants and desires. These secondary skills and virtues of obedience and conformity are inculcated by the curriculum, especially the reading matter, and the rituals are bound up with the daily round at school such as the attendance as a group at church services, the memorization and repetition of the school regulations, the calling off and writing down of the names of the children by the teacher. This was all supplemented by the focused behavioral disciplining of the children and their bodies, from sitting quietly to penmanship.

In the context of the German Jewish schools, against the backdrop of the then contemporary discourse regarding tolerance and improvement, these elements take on a special importance. The aim of moral improvement is given additional weight here. For the Jews, “moral instruction” in the German schools – specifically called such or disguised as ‘reading’ – must have constituted an open affront. Seen in purely instrumental terms, learning a little of how to read and write German and do some sums could have done no particular harm. But the reading material contained moral maxims, messages that were hard to integrate into the traditional cosmos of Jewish values. Simply the desire of the state to educate Jewish children morally constituted a

challenge, as it posed a threat to the unity of traditional Jewish education in the family and the Jewish heder. “Morals” in the sense of traditional religious-ethical values were inculcated in the children and youth by their parents, by reading and learning the texts of Jewish scripture and the Mishnah, by ethical *musar* literature and the sermons in the synagogue. Morals in this sense generally signified ethical-moral behavior in an *internal* Jewish context, Jews among Jews. For dealings with the non-Jewish world, practical everyday experience was considered sufficient ‘schooling,’ along with an awareness of the consequences of proper behavior or the transgression of external norms. In the German Jewish school the children looked through a window into a moral cosmos that was not their own. The illustrative tales in the so-called *Namenbüchlein* reader, for instance, drew basically on the enlightened universal norms of a non-Jewish pedagogy.⁴ They imparted values deemed necessary for living in a new moral reality still to be created, one in which Jews and Christians were to encounter one another without prejudice.

Moral instruction in the German Jewish schools had an ‘enlightening’ disciplining function in the sense of a discursive New Order in the familiar world: it was geared to reinterpreting experience in the *Lebenswelt*, the life world. This is especially evident in the segment of the curriculum that could be called “social studies” (*Soziallehre*), for which the third and fifth section of the reader provided various appropriate texts.⁵ The very young readers, addressed not as Jews but generally as subjects of the state, learned here for the first time about the complexity of society, the interdependence of social groups, and the many duties and obligations involved in this society. Actions oriented to the non-Jewish world, whose normative horizon of justification had previously tended to be governed situationally by the halakhic principle of *dina demalkhuta dina*, such as payment of taxes, or the acceptance of general norms of law, were given a universal foundation by rational arguments that embedded actions in the total social context. Moral instruction demanded of children a specific relationship to their sovereign and ‘fatherland.’ This very creation of a sense of belonging to a fatherland shattered the framework of traditional Jewish norms.

The new concept of subject of the state extended far beyond the previous understanding of authority. As subjects and patriots, the children were not only expected to obey their sovereign in all matters in future, but also to trust in him, to

love him. Their future obligations encompassed obligations such as “not to do anything harmful toward the government, nor to speak things harmful,” to obey the laws, to trust in “the insights and honesty of the rulers,” to serve the best interests of the state in all their actions, and, in the event of war, to defend the fatherland. Jewish youth was here confronted for the first time with such moral and social concepts. To speak more metaphorically, the world of the ‘*goyim*’ was transmuted into ‘society’ and the ‘*parits*’ (landowner, squire) was supplanted by an all-demanding state. Whether and to what degree the Jewish children internalized these values, or whether they simply more or less mechanically recited what they had memorized when district inspectors came to the schools is a separate question. In the context of our inquiry, we are initially interested in the degree to which the Galician Jews necessarily had to perceive instruction in the German schools as contrary to and at odds with Jewish tradition.

But this is only one aspect of disciplining – the training of the children inside the classroom. When I use the term *social disciplining* in the context of the school system, I am also basically interested in another space and dimension. For me, disciplining is not only the training of the pupils in the values of industriousness, productivity, obedience, etc. for cameralist pedagogical motives. Rather, I am interested in how the techniques of disciplining and social control extended beyond the immediate instruction and educating of the children. In this perspective, the state schools – Jewish and non-Jewish alike – emerge as centers of gravity of disciplining, from which, as the German political scientist and Foucault translator Walther Seitter put it, “a ray goes forth into the population, grasping the human being,”⁶ and pulling the population into the vortex of norming, control, and sanction. The events of disciplining affect a range of stakeholders: children and teachers, the parents, the representatives of the local communities, and the corporative associations, which since the late eighteenth century were only marginally autonomous, such as the Jewish *kahal* in Galicia. Discipline is manifest in the normed training of teachers and the “disciplinary rules” meant for them, the “points on proper behavior” in one’s profession, and the achieving of discipline and order in the classroom.⁷ Discipline encompasses in a literal sense all the children, whether they take part in formal instruction or not, by the very means of registering all children of school age and checking on their presence in or absence from the schools.⁸ By the compulsory

registering of children in school, the families of the children are also placed under the supervision and control of the state authorities. If the children are absent and their names are included in the list of absentees, the parents are threatened with serious penalties. By means of compulsory schooling, they too are educated into being objects of discipline, who obey prescribed norms and are diligent about sending their children to school regularly. Finally, the communities and corporate associations become participants in the process of disciplining through their inclusion in the system of compulsory schooling and the partial transfer of penal authority, though at the same time they also act as its antagonists.

I only wish here to indicate that I also view the German Jewish schools within the context of Austrian demographic policy toward the Jews in Galicia. Confronted with a Jewish population of a size never experienced before and given the large number of indigent Jews, the Austrian state sees itself facing huge challenges. Along with their pedagogical and utilitarian aims, the schools are an instrument for controlling the population. To keep children in schools or force them to attend also involves some mode of control over their parents. The ‘family numbers’ of the parents are registered along with the children they send to school. In this way, the teachers and district officials know that the parents are residents. The registered family number of children who do not attend school is, by contrast, not only an indicator of deviant behavior, but also signals the danger of vagrancy. If the child is not in school, maybe the family is no longer in the village or town. At the least, the family can no longer be registered, located, controlled. In the Galician-Jewish context, the general cameralist aim of preventing vagrancy and vagabonding, namely the uncontrolled free travel of persons, takes on special meaning in the discourse of disciplining. As Foucault reminds us in speaking about “docile bodies”: “Disciplinary space tends to be divided into as many sections as there are bodies or elements to be distributed. One must eliminate the effects of imprecise distributions, the uncontrolled disappearance of individuals, their diffuse circulation, their unusable and dangerous coagulation.”⁹ Only if children attend school regularly can the population be calculated and kept under control.

However, even if I conceive of “social disciplining” in this amplified sense, I cannot do proper justice to the story in its entire complexity if I make use solely of the macro-perspective and concentrate only on the normative side of events and

processes. So it is best if I utilize the concept only in tandem and contrasted with a micro-historical, cultural-anthropological prism on the process. In this context, social control and disciplining find their correlate in the *life world* or *Lebenswelt*¹⁰ of the individuals and groups that have come under the sway of the school *qua* institution, and in their highly specialized repertory of strategies for resistance. Specific facets of the *Lebenswelt* that bring it unavoidably into conflict with the disciplinary system of the school are inter alia economic necessities of various types, generally the compulsions and constraints flowing from a life dominated by agriculture. In the Jewish context, it is often compounded by the role of the children as supplementary bread-winners or helpers in the work of the household, owing to the dire poverty of their home environment. In the context of this conflict between social disciplining and the life world, an important role is played by the norms and values taught in alternative educational systems, or quite simply by the amount of time needed for this traditional education. The virulent conflict between the educative *chronos* of instruction in the German Jewish schools and the ritual *chronos* of instruction in the heder has to be seen in this general context. Also relevant here are traditional notions of the sexes and the behavior resulting from those notions, which collides head-on with the aim of co-education in the elementary schools.

The constraints and values of the life world fundamentally demand that there be opposition to inroads made by the disciplining system of the state. The imperative of the *Lebenswelt* is to elude being registered, controlled, and subjected to a norming sanction. Counterstrategies anchored in the life world can make it more difficult for the state to gain control of the population through the institution of the school. In the Jewish context in Galicia, we can find a whole series of these strategies: the utilizing of loopholes in the web of norms and control mechanisms, playing off the interests of one against the other at the level of the authorities, clandestine strategies and tactics of camouflage, all these against the backdrop of a still largely intact traditional fabric of social cohesion and an often chronic weakness on the part of the organs of discipline to implement their will. The sources suggest that the Galician Jews had a quite inexhaustible inventiveness in tricking the authorities. A popular strategy was to give older ages for children so that they were excluded from compulsory schooling or were able to avoid the prohibition on marrying without a school certificate.¹¹ Around 1789 school inspectors reported that in some localities, boys of 10 were already laying

tefillin so that their parents could claim they were 13 – because the obligation to attend school ended with the thirteenth year.¹² Jewish parents were able to count on the potential corruptibility of the teachers and officials, and were able to buy school grades or send their children to marry in other communities.¹³ They could send other children to the *Kreisamt* (district office) to take the exam in place of their own offspring.¹⁴

Now, against my counterposing of the disciplining system and the *Lebenswelt*, one could argue that the life world is a structured world as well; it also contains elements of control and disciplining, and these were especially pronounced under the conditions of Jewish local autonomy. That is true. But these elements belong to the *Lebenswelt* itself, to the cosmos of traditional, symbolic values that could be experienced on a daily basis – and were not part of the alien sphere of state social disciplining. Indeed, these values often collided with the aims and measures of that disciplining. One example can serve as an illustration.

In the communities of Lvov and Brody, since the early 1790s, as based on the assessment of Homberg and the authorities, school attendance by Jewish children was very low. I do not wish to discuss here whether this desolate situation in these two communities was symptomatic of the general situation of the German Jewish schools in Galicia at the time and whether it reflects a precarious situation over a longer period. In any case we should not be deceived by official rhetoric and should bear in mind that perhaps we are mistaken about the actual facts in Lvov and Brody as based on the sources available regarding school attendance. But that is of less importance here. What I want to look at is the concrete situation and its interpretation by Homberg and the authorities. Around 1791/1792, school attendance by Jewish children in Lvov and Brody sank to virtually zero. Generally, in the context of the Austrian regime of compulsory schooling, the authorities regarded penalties for parents who kept their children out of school as an instrument to encourage better school attendance by Jewish pupils. One of the decisive weak points in sanctioning deviance in attendance was the fact that the implementation of the official penalties (*Strafexekution*) was left to the *kahal*. The board of the *kahal*, the *Vorsteher* or *parnasim*, received the lists of the notorious school absentees as prepared by the teachers and sent them on to the *Kreisamt*. At that point they should have contacted

the parents of these children, collected the penalty from them, and deposited it in the district bank. In cases of multiple offenders in regard to school attendance or parents who were too poor to pay the fine, they should then have had the family heads detained and handed over to the authorities to be deployed on public work projects or placed under arrest. But this was not done. The fines were not collected. Symptomatic here is the difference noted in 1793 by the Lemberg *Kreiskasse*, the local district bank, between the sum of 1,149 gulden in fines officially levied for the previous two years and the actual amount paid in up until then, namely 74 gulden.¹⁵ I am not aware of any indication in the sources that a Jewish father who did not send his children to school was actually detained and conscripted for labor or put in jail. On the contrary, there were many complaints that the laws were not being enforced. The harsh tone in the instructions from Vienna to finally take decisive action became ever sharper.

In view of this problematic situation for the government, the cooperation between the bodies of the central administration and the local *kahal* seems quite illogical. Why did the state give the *Vorsteher* the power to levy the penalties if they were well known for thwarting their implementation? In his school report in the summer of 1791, Herz Homberg himself called the attention of the central authorities to this absurdity. He regarded the alliance between resistant *parnasim* and overworked and unwilling district officials as the potential roadblock preventing the realization of the ideal of the school he, together with the authorities, was striving to achieve. Thus he demanded that he himself be empowered to issue penalties in Lvov and that the head teacher of the Brody Jewish elementary school, Minden, likewise be given that authority.¹⁶ What Homberg did not understand or did not wish to see was the fact that this problem was structural: the state authorities acted the way they did because they had no real alternative. In the early modern state, it was generally the case that the authorities depended on corporative bodies that were actually at odds with their own interests. As German historian Wolfgang Hardtwig put it, the ever more centralized absolutist state depended as well on cooperation with the traditional associations “that regulated commerce and trade, urban and rural work, support for the indigent and the system of social welfare. The *Policey* of the principality made use of them but insisted on the need to transform the originally independent associations into organs of state administration [...] The corporation remained indispensable until the estate-structured

and ranked *societas civilis* was finally transformed into modern civil society as the aggregate of the subjects of private law.”¹⁷

Thus the Josephine Austrian state could not ignore the corporative bodies when dealing with regulating of the diverse spheres of life. This was especially true under the conditions in annexed Galicia, which were reminiscent of the situation of a “bygone era,” and against the backdrop of the weak penetration of the territory by state institutions, the frequent lack of enough government workers, and officials’ often inadequate knowledge of the local situation. This general reality was even more in evidence in the contexts of the Jewish life worlds, which were opaque to the state officials. The *kahal*, now the state-authorized leadership of the Jewish community, made up of the most influential members of the community, especially distinguished by dint of their wealth, erudition, or connections, still had the best overview of the structures within Jewish society and the social and financial situations of the families. It watched over the traditional systems of welfare and education and made sure that fundamental religious needs were met. Even if the key instruments of its former disciplinary power – rabbinical courts and the law of banishment – had been rescinded, the *kahal* nonetheless retained a symbolic yet significant portion of this power firmly in its own hands. The *parnasim* had considerable say, and to act against them might bring social exclusion or economic consequences.

There is little doubt that a certain lassitude or even corruptibility on the part of the officials in the *Kreisamt* contributed to a situation in which the *parnasim* were able to postpone or torpedo the implementation of penalties without any serious consequences. The superordinate authorities higher up in the hierarchy, such as the Court Chancellery in Vienna and the Galician *Gubernium* (Provincial Head Administration) in Lemberg, understood quite well that local state administration had to depend on cooperation with the *kahal*. The ambivalence of their directives regarding the failure to impose penalties is instructive. On the one hand, they criticized the district officials in the *Kreisamt* for relying too much on the *parnasim* for taking care of certain school matters. On the other, they instructed the *Kreisamt* to continue with the practice of assigning the power of implementing sanctions to the *parnasim*, even if Homberg complained that this caused great harm to the school system. It was not just the schools and their success that were bound up with the

willingness of the *kahal* to cooperate. One may even assume that given the large number and importance of other spheres of life that had to be regulated in cooperation with the *kahal* that, depending on the situation, the German Jewish school system was regarded by the central government administration as an area of lower priority.

The state's interest was focused on a more significant financial plane: tax collection from the Jewish population, which was handled largely by the *kahal*. Moreover, demographic policy aspects were of special importance, such as supervising of social parameters and fluctuations in the Galician Jewish population. Control over Jewish marriage and reproduction and preventing penurious Jews from vagrancy, together with the shaping of welfare inside the Jewish community were decisive arenas of interaction between the *Kreisamt* and the *kahal*, under the general aspect of *Policey*, in addition to the drafting of Jews for military service, which began in the late 1780s. But these areas naturally harbored many factors for possible friction, where the energy of the authorities was drained. Ultimately, the *Kreisaemter* and the Galician *Gubernium* were dependent on the *parnasim* and their influence in shaping the patterns of living together and engaging in mutual commercial activity, Jews and non-Jews, in a given locality or territory. Against the backdrop of this interdependence, the German Jewish school system could at times be relegated to the back burner, so to speak. The local will to implement was far weaker than the rhetoric of implementation at the Court Chancellery or the *Gubernium*, to say nothing of the *Kreisamt*.

From the perspective of the *kahal*, its authority for implementing school penalties was no less precarious. As noted, the allocating of certain elements of disciplinary power to the corporative institutions was characteristic of state attempts at disciplining in the early modern period. Especially in the realm of police norms, the absolutist state initially sought to integrate “traditional and associational organs of informal social control” into the process of control over and implementation of norms. But since the corporations “developed a significant attachment to traditional ways, clinging to older norms and purposes for punishment,” they could only be used in a limited manner in the framework of implementing state norms or punishing their violation.¹⁸ These observations by the German early modernist Karl Härter, pertaining to the seventeenth and early eighteenth century, can doubtless also be applied to the Jewish context in Galicia toward the end of the eighteenth century. “Attachment to traditional ways”

and “clinging to older norms” were also characteristic of the *kahal* and its behavior toward attempts at disciplining by the state in the sphere of school education. Whereas the *parnasim* were prepared to cooperate with the state authorities in various spheres, in the field of education they resisted the implementation of state norms, since the execution of school penalties was at odds with their own interests. On the one hand, the maintenance of the German Jewish schools under Homberg’s supervision was not at all in the perceived interest of the *kahal*. Rather, the *kahal* sought to defend its own school system, which rested on traditional norms, against the pedagogical inroads of the state school system. On the other hand, from the perspective of the *kahal*, there were more important goals of “horizontal social control” to be pursued. In the ritual context of the life worlds of the Galician Jews, this involved, above all, matters of social welfare, the regulating of conflicts pertaining to family law, punishing of serious infractions of communal discipline, and, more generally, the securing of a peaceful life together and commercial intercourse within the Jewish community.

If the carrying out of school penalties could be seen as a kind of substitute for the now substantially curtailed traditional disciplinary power of the *kahal*, it was a quite problematic substitute. If the *parnasim* had actually energetically implemented the state penalties and sanctions, they would, in the eyes of the local Jews, have become virtual collaborators with the state authorities and with Homberg. This would have endangered the minimal consensus on which communal cohesion was moored, which in turn was necessary for a rudimentary level of horizontal social control by the *kahal*. For that reason, the *Vorsteher* were only able to deal in a dilatory fashion with the repeated demands to implement the penalties, or they rendered these demands nugatory by means of a finely crafted repertory of tactics for their frustration. Thus, they pointed in their responses to the poverty of the parents, the unjustified registering of children on the lists of absentees, the unreliability of these records generally, or on the release of so-called *Erlassscheine* – certificates that declared the nullification of orders of punishment. They accused the teachers of accepting bribes or even willfully thwarting the implementation of penalties in order to discredit the *parnasim* in the eyes of the authorities. Ultimately, the assertion that Homberg and the teachers, by behavior that was inimical to tradition, were themselves to blame for the minimal interest in the schools was the most common argument used by the *kahal* leaders against the system.

So why did the authorities leave the power to carry out penalties in the hands of the *parnasim*? If the Court Chancellery and *Gubernium* had responded positively to Homberg's request that he be given the power to implement penalties, along with his associate, the teacher Minden in Brody, it would have meant that the state would have been obliged to depart and divorce itself from a previously operative principle. It would also have meant that it was no longer the corporation, that is, the *kahal*, that would be responsible for punishing deviant behavior in this sphere, acting for the state. Rather, that prerogative would have passed to a new elite of quasi-state Jewish school officials, which was distrusted or even hated by the Jewish community. This move would have had a negative impact on cooperation between the *kahal* and the state in other spheres, and, finally, would have implied a downgrading of the *Kreisamt*. Such a step would have basically been in keeping with the logic of absolutist centralization and disciplining as Homberg may have interpreted it. However, in view of the actual situation in Galicia at the end of the eighteenth century, this interpretation went too far – it was in a word too modern.

¹ Gerhard Oestreich, Strukturprobleme des europäischen Absolutismus, *Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte* 55 (1968), pp. 329–347. See also Winfried Schulze, Gerhard Oestreichs Begriff “Sozialdisziplinierung in der frühen Neuzeit,” *Zeitschrift für Historische Forschung* 14 (1987), pp. 265–302. Over the past two decades, Oestreich’s concept has run up against some critique and resistance on the part of scholars in Germany and Europe working on the early modern period and oriented to the cultural sciences. Nonetheless, supplemented and expanded by an array of approaches grounded in the history of everyday life, the history of culture, and micro-historical studies, that concept has been establish itself as one of the decisive interpretative keys for research on the early modern period. See Ulrich Behrens, “Sozialdisziplinierung” als Konzeption der Frühneuzeitforschung: Genese, Weiterwirkung und Kritik. Eine Zwischenbilanz, *Historische Mitteilungen der Ranke-Gesellschaft* 12 (1999), pp. 35–67; Heinz Schilling, Profil und Perspektiven einer interdisziplinären und komparatistischen Disziplinierungsforschung jenseits einer Dichotomie von Gesellschafts- und Kulturgeschichte, in: idem (ed.), *Institutionen, Instrumente und Akteure sozialer Kontrolle und Disziplinierung im frühneuzeitlichen Europa*, Frankfurt/Main 1999 (Ius Commune, Sonderhefte 127), pp. 3–36; Günther Lottes, Disziplin und Emanzipation. Das Sozialdisziplinierungskonzept und die Interpretation der frühneuzeitlichen Geschichte, *Westfälische Forschungen* 42 (1992), pp. 63–74. For the criticism of the concept, see Martin Dinges, Frühneuzeitliche Armenfürsorge als Sozialdisziplinierung? Probleme mit einem Konzept, *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 17 (1991), pp. 5–29; Heinrich Richard Schmidt, Sozialdisziplinierung? Ein Plädoyer für das Ende des Etatismus in der Konfessionalisierungsforschung, *Historische Zeitschrift* 265 (1997), pp. 639–682. A good example of the use of the concept of social disciplining together with methods of the history of culture and historical anthropology, see Gerhard Ammerer, *Heimat Straße: Vaganten im Österreich des Ancien Régime*, Wien/München 2003.

² Michel Foucault, *Überwachen und Strafen. Die Geburt des Gefängnisses*, Frankfurt a. M. 1994 (*Surveiller et punir. La naissance de la prison*, Paris 1975; Engl. *Discipline and Punish. The Birth of the Prison*, New York 1977). For a comparison between the different concepts of discipline and disciplining see: Stefan Breuer, Sozialdisziplinierung. Probleme und Problemverlagerungen eines Konzepts bei Max Weber, Gerhard Oestreich und Michel Foucault, in: Christoph Sachße/Florian Tennstedt (eds.), *Soziale Sicherheit und soziale Disziplinierung. Beiträge zu einer historischen Theorie der Sozialpolitik*, Frankfurt/Main 1986, pp. 45–69.

³ James Van Horn Melton, *Absolutism and the Eighteenth-Century Origins of Compulsory Schooling in Prussia and Austria*, Cambridge 1988.

⁴ *ABC oder Nahmenbüchlein für Anfänger zur Erlernung der Druck-, Latein- und Kurrentschrift zum Gebrauche der Schulen in den k.k. Staaten*, Wien 1774; for the use for instruction in the German Jewish schools the reader was adapted to Jewish contexts – i.e., cleared of Christian content – by the Bohemian school reformer Ferdinand Kindermann in 1781. There was only a later version available to me: *ABC und Buchstabirbüchlein nebst den Leseübungen für die jüdische Jugend der deutschen Schulen im Königreiche Böhmeim*, Prague 1801. See Gabriele von Glasenapp/Michael Nagel, *Das jüdische Jugendbuch. Von der Aufklärung bis zum Dritten Reich*, Stuttgart/Weimar 1996, p. 26.

⁵ *Lesebuch für die jüdische Jugend der deutschen Schulen im Königreiche Böhmeim, bestehend in der Anleitung zur Rechtschaffenheit*, Prague 1781, “Drittes Stück. Von der Gesellschaft, darin die Menschen zu leben von Gott bestimmt sind, und von den gesellschaftlichen Pflichten” (pp. 69–100); “Fünftes Stück. Von der Vaterlandsliebe” (pp. 114–140).

⁶ Walter Seitter, *Menschenfassungen. Studien zur Erkenntnispolitikwissenschaft*, München 1985, p. 74.

⁷ *Disciplinarvorschriften*, Wien 1781, quoted in Helmut Engelbrecht, *Geschichte des österreichischen Bildungswesens. Erziehung und Unterricht auf dem Boden Österreichs. Band 3: Von der frühen Aufklärung bis zum Vormärz*, Wien 1984, pp. 506–508. In 1788, Herz Homberg released the *Verhaltungspunkte für jüdische Schullehrer in Galizien und Lodomerien*. Also large parts of Felbiger’s “Methodenbuch” and “Kern des Methodenbuches” contained instructions for the behavior of the teacher.

⁸ See the instructions for the registering of school children in the Allgemeine Schulordnung für die deutschen Normal-, Haupt- und Trivialschulen in sämtlichen Kaiserl. Königl. Erbländern (1774), quoted in Engelbrecht, *Geschichte des österreichischen Bildungswesens*, p. 497.

⁹ Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, p. 143.

¹⁰ A useful if abstract definition of the cultural-history concept of *Lebenswelt* is that by Rudolf Vierhaus: “By *Lebenswelt* or life-world we refer to the more or less clearly perceived reality in which social groups and individuals act and interact, and through their thinking and action in turn produce reality. This includes everything that creates meaning and continuity: the objectivations of the intellect in language and symbols, in works and institutions, but also in ways and forms of creation and creativity, ways of behavior, lifestyles, world views and guiding conceptions. To put it differently: *Lebenswelt* is social reality determined by time and space, where traditional norms and those in the process of change are valid, institutions exist and are created anew. Human beings do not stand over against this life world, but rather are enveloped within it, inside it as a world which has always been interpreted symbolically.” See Rudolf Vierhaus, *Die Rekonstruktion historischer Lebenswelten. Probleme moderner*

Kulturgeschichtsschreibung , in: Hartmut Lehmann (ed.), *Wege zu einer neuen Kulturgeschichte* (Göttinger Gespräche zur Geschichtswissenschaft 1), Göttingen 1995, pp. 7–28, here pp. 12f.

¹¹ For example: “Bericht des galizischen Landesguberniums uiber die von Hof remittierte Klage der hiesigen jüdischen deutschen Lehrer Turnau, Popper, und Grünbaum wegen des Verfalls der hiesigen jüdischen Schulen” vom 11.6.1792, question VII: “Warum, da es bekannt ist, daß die Juden ihre Kinder, um sie von der Schule zu befreien, für älter anzugeben pflegen...,” AVA, StHK, Kt. 861, 23 A Galizien; see also the letter from the Lemberg district office to the *kahal* of November 7, 1793, CAHJP HM 2/8193.2.

¹² See the report of the school supervisor of the Przemysl district, October 1, 1789: “Die herabgelangte Verordnung, daß nur jene Schüler, die den Tiphilim tragen, von der Schule ausgeschlossen seyn sollen, hält bei den dieskreisigen Juden wenig Stich, indem sie ihn auch schon Kindern von 10 Jahren ertheilen, und dazu jene Zeit bestimmen, wenn ihnen das Talmudstudium mehr in den Kopf gehe. Auf diese Art dürften viele Schüler im künftigen Kurse ausbleiben, denn wenigstens das 10te bei jeder Schule ist schon damit versehen, und itzt um so mehr da dieß das einzige Mittel ist die Kinder der Schule zu entziehen.” CAHJP, HM 2/ 9676.7.

¹³ See the denunciatory letter of Johann Alser to the Lemberg district office of September 9, 1794, CAHJP, HM 2/8193.5.

¹⁴ AVA, StHK, Kt. 861, 23 Galizien–Lemberg, “Aaron Gesezwy zeigt unterhänigst einen zum jüdischen Schulwesen verübten nachtheiligen Vorfall von jüdischen Lehrer Schorr an,” August 27, 1804.

¹⁵ Letter of Nov. 20, 1793. CAHJP, HM 2/8193/2.

¹⁶ AVA, StHK, Kt. 861, 23 A Galizien, report of Hombergs of Nov. 13, 1791.

¹⁷ Wolfgang Hardtwig, *Genossenschaft, Sekte, Verein in Deutschland*, Vol. I, p. 366.

¹⁸ Karl Härter, Soziale Disziplinierung durch Strafe? Intentionen frühneuzeitlicher Policyordnungen und staatliche Sanktionspraxis, *Zeitschrift für Historische Forschung* 26 (1999), pp. 365–379, p. 372.